rmation and then be alerted as each transaction or event occurs.

It is impossible to guard against such randomness, without stepping out of time and putting the pieces together as they fall, thus you ne

What can we learn from the Uni-Bomber and Al Queda with regards to surveillance for Homeland Security? Few have considered why the uni-bomber was so effective and why he was able to go undetected. Some believe one aspect was that he worked alone, told no one. This makes it difficult to catch him. Yet, others see in a way much of Al Queda is working similarly and believe that the way to catch a uni-bomber type is similar to catching Al Queda leadership.

Any group sworn to secrecy could do this, but the weakest human in the group is a way to infiltrate. How these groups take their time to collect the components to make a bomb and set up plans over long periods of time and wait until the appropriate time, makes it difficult to catch them; difficult indeed, but hardly impossible. It is therefore necessary to collect information and then be alerted as each transaction or event occurs.

It is impossible to guard against such randomness, without stepping out of time and putting the pieces together as they fall, thus you nee

e one aspect was that he worked alone, told no one. This makes it difficult to catch him. Yet, others see in a way much of Al Queda is working similarly and believe that the way to catch a uni-bomber type is similar to catching Al Queda leadership.

Any group sworn to secrecy could do this, but the weakest human in the group is a way to infiltrate. How these groups take their time to collect the components to make a bomb and set up plans over long periods of time and wait until the appropriate time, makes it difficult to catch them; difficult indeed, but hardly impossible. It is therefore necessary to collect information and then be alerted as each transaction or event occurs.

It is impossible to guard against such randomness, without stepping out of time and putting the pieces together as they fall, thus you ne

imilar to catching Al Queda leadership.

Any group sworn to secrecy could do this, but the weakest human in the group is a way to infiltrate. How these groups take their time to collect the components to make a bomb and set up plans over long periods of time and wait until the appropriate time, makes it difficult to catch them; difficult indeed, but hardly impossible. It is therefore necessary to collect information and then be alerted as each transaction or event occurs.

It is impossible to guard against such randomness, without stepping out of time and putting the pieces together as they fall, thus you ne

make a bomb and set up plans over long periods of time and wait until the appropriate time, makes it difficult to catch them; difficult indeed, but hardly impossible. It is therefore necessary to collect information and then be alerted as each transaction or event occurs.

It is impossible to guard against such randomness, without stepping out of time and putting the pieces together as they fall, thus you ne

rmation and then be alerted as each transaction or event occurs.

It is impossible to guard against such randomness, without stepping out of time and putting the pieces together as they fall, thus you need good surveillance and intelligence, which is what President Bush is talking about when he says we need to be able to intercept phone calls from Al Queda coming into the US or those who are calling from the US to Al Queda. “If you are talking to Al Queda, well then we would certainly like to know about it and why!”

If we approach surveillance in this way and do so with some extra investigative work we could actually stay one-step ahead of Al Queda and perhaps actually pick them off as they plot and plan. But it will not work without permission to use surveillance in advance of the dastardly potential eventuality that these murderous international terrorists are planning. Think on this in 2006.