ldn’t be compared to American: more than 90% of resources and 95% of advanced technology armaments were supplies by the Americans. American government was aware, already before taking decision on anti-Talib war launch, that there was no chance of reckoning on something more than political support and some complimentary military functions on NATO’s part.

The last point demonstrating Washington’s attitude to the enlargement process was elaboration of Iraqi operation implementation scenario in 2002-2003, which didn’t even include NATO as military structure along with a number of minor allies. Among other reasons, this happened because absence of internal accord within North Atlantic Treaty Organization concerning necessity of the operation, firmly advocated by the USA and Great Britain.

Consequently, American interest in NATO as a block of military allies in many ways expired. The main mission of the Alliance for the United Stat

NATO enlargement is doubtless one of the most important issues in NATO-USA relations and in attitude of American politics towards this organization. Therefore, in dealing with American-European relations within NATO, it is impossible to question the issue of enlargement of this alliance.

NATO enlargement towards Central and Eastern European states was originally the major project in seconding NATO’s viability. The purpose of the first enlargement round was regarded by the USA in preservation of NATO as a form of military-political cooperation between the USA and Europe and conservation of American influence on European security along with strengthening Western military potential for resistance of possible, even in post-bipolar era, threats from the East.

To this end, and also with the aim of overcoming alarm of many European allies as to Russian attitude towards enlargement, American diplomacy took to creation and consolidation in Western-European and American political discourses of idea on additional NATO’s function as an organization focusing on spread of democratic values and institutions and stabilizing internal political situation in member-countries.

North Atlantic Alliance as instrument of promotion of democracy and stability was accepted by the European leaders as indubitably necessary. In that way, having ensured Europeans’ consent to such broadened understanding of NATO’s function, the United States consequently brought the conflict with Russia to acceptable intensity level by providing Moscow with “special status” in its relations with the Alliance, which was fixed in Fundamental Act between Russian Federation and NATO, signed in May of 1997.

The current article isn’t aimed at complete revealing of all the details of NATO enlargement process but instead focuses on the principal issues of American policy shift regarding NATO in general and its enlargement in particular.

While in the early January of 1994 the text of President’s „State of the Union” speech noted that American security will further depend on the US ability to most effectively ensure democratic development of Eastern European states, in this way putting particular emphasis on principal role of NATO enlargement for American interests, in the late 1990s and early 2000s this approach fundamentally changed.

When in the middle 1990s there emerged an issue of NATO preservation in new circumstances, the United States regarded their North Atlantic allies as potential assistants in carrying out their military operations worldwide in interests of America. But Washington’s expectations concerning significant military contribution of Allies confronted with a cruel reality. For the USA, 1990s became a period of more intense economic growth as compared to the Europeans. This was attended by fast technological progress, particularly in military industry. At the same time, European Allies shortened their military budgets. Thus, 4,565 million dollars, being merely 13-% rise in American military budget, turned out to exceed total budget of any of NATO allies. By the end of the decade, this trend led to the fatal gap of Europe from the level of American military and technological potential. The Allies, apart from Great Britain in some particular cases, proved simply unable to grant the USA assistance in military operations requiring decent technological level.

This gap very soon was revealed in action yet before the launch of second NATO enlargement debate. Thus, among the NATO resources involved in Yugoslav military campaign in spring-summer of 1999, American resources played the principal role: about 60-70% of air force and 80-90% of cruise missiles were American. During anti-Talib operation of autumn 2001 even British contribution couldn’t be compared to American: more than 90% of resources and 95% of advanced technology armaments were supplies by the Americans. American government was aware, already before taking decision on anti-Talib war launch, that there was no chance of reckoning on something more than political support and some complimentary military functions on NATO’s part.

The last point demonstrating Washington’s attitude to the enlargement process was elaboration of Iraqi operation implementation scenario in 2002-2003, which didn’t even include NATO as military structure along with a number of minor allies. Among other reasons, this happened because absence of internal accord within North Atlantic Treaty Organization concerning necessity of the operation, firmly advocated by the USA and Great Britain.

Consequently, American interest in NATO as a block of military allies in many ways expired. The main mission of the Alliance for the United Stat

on in Western-European and American political discourses of idea on additional NATO’s function as an organization focusing on spread of democratic values and institutions and stabilizing internal political situation in member-countries.

North Atlantic Alliance as instrument of promotion of democracy and stability was accepted by the European leaders as indubitably necessary. In that way, having ensured Europeans’ consent to such broadened understanding of NATO’s function, the United States consequently brought the conflict with Russia to acceptable intensity level by providing Moscow with “special status” in its relations with the Alliance, which was fixed in Fundamental Act between Russian Federation and NATO, signed in May of 1997.

The current article isn’t aimed at complete revealing of all the details of NATO enlargement process but instead focuses on the principal issues of American policy shift regarding NATO in general and its enlargement in particular.

While in the early January of 1994 the text of President’s „State of the Union” speech noted that American security will further depend on the US ability to most effectively ensure democratic development of Eastern European states, in this way putting particular emphasis on principal role of NATO enlargement for American interests, in the late 1990s and early 2000s this approach fundamentally changed.

When in the middle 1990s there emerged an issue of NATO preservation in new circumstances, the United States regarded their North Atlantic allies as potential assistants in carrying out their military operations worldwide in interests of America. But Washington’s expectations concerning significant military contribution of Allies confronted with a cruel reality. For the USA, 1990s became a period of more intense economic growth as compared to the Europeans. This was attended by fast technological progress, particularly in military industry. At the same time, European Allies shortened their military budgets. Thus, 4,565 million dollars, being merely 13-% rise in American military budget, turned out to exceed total budget of any of NATO allies. By the end of the decade, this trend led to the fatal gap of Europe from the level of American military and technological potential. The Allies, apart from Great Britain in some particular cases, proved simply unable to grant the USA assistance in military operations requiring decent technological level.

This gap very soon was revealed in action yet before the launch of second NATO enlargement debate. Thus, among the NATO resources involved in Yugoslav military campaign in spring-summer of 1999, American resources played the principal role: about 60-70% of air force and 80-90% of cruise missiles were American. During anti-Talib operation of autumn 2001 even British contribution couldn’t be compared to American: more than 90% of resources and 95% of advanced technology armaments were supplies by the Americans. American government was aware, already before taking decision on anti-Talib war launch, that there was no chance of reckoning on something more than political support and some complimentary military functions on NATO’s part.

The last point demonstrating Washington’s attitude to the enlargement process was elaboration of Iraqi operation implementation scenario in 2002-2003, which didn’t even include NATO as military structure along with a number of minor allies. Among other reasons, this happened because absence of internal accord within North Atlantic Treaty Organization concerning necessity of the operation, firmly advocated by the USA and Great Britain.

Consequently, American interest in NATO as a block of military allies in many ways expired. The main mission of the Alliance for the United Stat

and its enlargement in particular.

While in the early January of 1994 the text of President’s „State of the Union” speech noted that American security will further depend on the US ability to most effectively ensure democratic development of Eastern European states, in this way putting particular emphasis on principal role of NATO enlargement for American interests, in the late 1990s and early 2000s this approach fundamentally changed.

When in the middle 1990s there emerged an issue of NATO preservation in new circumstances, the United States regarded their North Atlantic allies as potential assistants in carrying out their military operations worldwide in interests of America. But Washington’s expectations concerning significant military contribution of Allies confronted with a cruel reality. For the USA, 1990s became a period of more intense economic growth as compared to the Europeans. This was attended by fast technological progress, particularly in military industry. At the same time, European Allies shortened their military budgets. Thus, 4,565 million dollars, being merely 13-% rise in American military budget, turned out to exceed total budget of any of NATO allies. By the end of the decade, this trend led to the fatal gap of Europe from the level of American military and technological potential. The Allies, apart from Great Britain in some particular cases, proved simply unable to grant the USA assistance in military operations requiring decent technological level.

This gap very soon was revealed in action yet before the launch of second NATO enlargement debate. Thus, among the NATO resources involved in Yugoslav military campaign in spring-summer of 1999, American resources played the principal role: about 60-70% of air force and 80-90% of cruise missiles were American. During anti-Talib operation of autumn 2001 even British contribution couldn’t be compared to American: more than 90% of resources and 95% of advanced technology armaments were supplies by the Americans. American government was aware, already before taking decision on anti-Talib war launch, that there was no chance of reckoning on something more than political support and some complimentary military functions on NATO’s part.

The last point demonstrating Washington’s attitude to the enlargement process was elaboration of Iraqi operation implementation scenario in 2002-2003, which didn’t even include NATO as military structure along with a number of minor allies. Among other reasons, this happened because absence of internal accord within North Atlantic Treaty Organization concerning necessity of the operation, firmly advocated by the USA and Great Britain.

Consequently, American interest in NATO as a block of military allies in many ways expired. The main mission of the Alliance for the United Stat

cal progress, particularly in military industry. At the same time, European Allies shortened their military budgets. Thus, 4,565 million dollars, being merely 13-% rise in American military budget, turned out to exceed total budget of any of NATO allies. By the end of the decade, this trend led to the fatal gap of Europe from the level of American military and technological potential. The Allies, apart from Great Britain in some particular cases, proved simply unable to grant the USA assistance in military operations requiring decent technological level.

This gap very soon was revealed in action yet before the launch of second NATO enlargement debate. Thus, among the NATO resources involved in Yugoslav military campaign in spring-summer of 1999, American resources played the principal role: about 60-70% of air force and 80-90% of cruise missiles were American. During anti-Talib operation of autumn 2001 even British contribution couldn’t be compared to American: more than 90% of resources and 95% of advanced technology armaments were supplies by the Americans. American government was aware, already before taking decision on anti-Talib war launch, that there was no chance of reckoning on something more than political support and some complimentary military functions on NATO’s part.

The last point demonstrating Washington’s attitude to the enlargement process was elaboration of Iraqi operation implementation scenario in 2002-2003, which didn’t even include NATO as military structure along with a number of minor allies. Among other reasons, this happened because absence of internal accord within North Atlantic Treaty Organization concerning necessity of the operation, firmly advocated by the USA and Great Britain.

Consequently, American interest in NATO as a block of military allies in many ways expired. The main mission of the Alliance for the United Stat

ldn’t be compared to American: more than 90% of resources and 95% of advanced technology armaments were supplies by the Americans. American government was aware, already before taking decision on anti-Talib war launch, that there was no chance of reckoning on something more than political support and some complimentary military functions on NATO’s part.

The last point demonstrating Washington’s attitude to the enlargement process was elaboration of Iraqi operation implementation scenario in 2002-2003, which didn’t even include NATO as military structure along with a number of minor allies. Among other reasons, this happened because absence of internal accord within North Atlantic Treaty Organization concerning necessity of the operation, firmly advocated by the USA and Great Britain.

Consequently, American interest in NATO as a block of military allies in many ways expired. The main mission of the Alliance for the United States now turned into political and back support of American military operations.

Such shift of mission caused change of American agenda for NATO. In such circumstances, avalanche-like Alliance enlargement became the most appropriate way of enlargement. Therefore, on Prague summit, the invitations to enter NATO were made to seven states: Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Estonia. Many of these states had to undergo a long way at least to reach the level of first-wave entrant states. However, in what concerns political support of American military initiatives, newly invited counties showed their support of American policy right away after Prague summit in discussions, and then in actions relating to Iraq in 2002-2004.

Since mid 2002, American political analysts have been growingly talking on shifting NATO’s role from military ally of the United States and instrument of collective protection of Allies’ security into “platform for coordination and facilitation of joint diplomatic actions with the uniformly thinking allies”. Besides, another advantage from mass enlargement of NATO to Easter-European countries was mentioned: possibility for the United States to “concentrate on other regions” after enlargement.

Read other articles in the series at Politics.